Omzinesý wrote: ↑26 Dec 2022 23:03
So, the question: both complements cannot be direct objects because one has to be able to distinguish them.
Why?
Having a verb be able to take arguments from two different classes with two different semantic implications is commonplace in real languages. In English, for example, I can hear a bang [i.e. my ears are impacted by a noise (the object) of some unstated cause] or I can hear a dog [I deduce the presence of a dog (a cause) via the experience of some unstated noise]. The propositional content structure of hearing a bang and hearing a dog are completely and utterly different, but English treats them as syntactically equivalent so pervasively that many speakers won't even realise the weird things going on with alignment and verbal semantics between these two sentences. Why should your auxlang be modeled on English assumptions rather than those of the speakers of other languages?
More dramatically, I can also taste not only both sweet and sour and both lemons and peaches, but also both success and defeat!
Many languages don't even have two different cases when ditransitives have two simultaneous objects - let alone for different types of transitive object!
But also, it seems incredibly Englishy to even think that we're dealing with two different meanings in your example anyway. In what way, in real terms, does la-ing an emotion differ from la-ing a fruit?
There's no ambiguity here. You mention "I like love", presumably vs "I feel love" ("I experience love", "I know love", "I am gripped by love", "I resemble love" etc) - but how is there an ambiguity here? There is in English, sure, because English happens to use the word 'feel' with emotions, rather than 'like', but there's no reason why that has to be the case - the choice of 'feel' is entirely arbitrary, and 'like' is no less accurate. A language coudl just have 'like' and 'feel' as the same word - in which case, no ambiguity. You might have in mind a thought like "I have enjoyed the times in my life when I have been in love" - but there's no reason that would have to be expressed as "I like love", which is kind of an arbitrary idiom for that. Or maybe you're thinking of a thought like "I am happy about being in love", but that gets into philosophical depths - can one really separate an emotion from a simultaneous emotion about the emotion? There's no reason this couldn't just be considered a different emotion (happy love vs guilty love is a perfectly valid semantic distinction). It's just a coincidence that English encourages you to express this thought in this precise way.
Likewise, you mention "I feel like a fruit", presumably vs "I like fruit". But the main use of the former is simply a modal paraphrase of the latter ('I would like fruit right now"), and there's no reason why you would need to encode that precise English idiom literally. There is a rarer (insane or poetic) sense, "I have the apprehension that I might be a fruit", but this meaning has nothing to do with the core semantics of "feeling" something. For example, rephrase 'feel' with (in this emotional context) a synonym: "I experience love" or "I am undergoing love" or "I possess love" or "I know love". None of these can be substituted into the 'fruit' sentence: I experience fruit, I am undergoing fruit, I possess fruit, I know fruit... none of these normally mean "I think I might be a fruit". This demonstrates that the use of "feel" in "I feel like a fruit" is an entirely different semantic use from the use of "feel" in "I feel love" - it may as well be an entirely different verb. It just happens not to be in English. So there's no reason why these verbs would be the same in your conlang either, so again there is no reason why speakers of your language would observe and ambiguity in these examples, given that one of the meanings of the English translation is essentially a pun in English.
You're clearly very keen on having your auxlang be 'logical'. Rather contradictorily so in my opinion, as I've said - auxlangs designed to be 'easy' or 'intuitive' will almost by definition not be 'logical'. But the bigger point is that one has to be careful not to assume that "what English (or other contemporary European languages) does" and "what is logical" are the same. Otherwise you'll encounter a pun in English and feel that it's an absolute feature of logic itself.
A big help here is not to think of everything in terms of literal English translations (which import all the multiple meanings of English words), but rather to think in terms of the functions of words - particularly when dealing with highly 'grammatical' and/or 'abstract' words in which idiomatic use and relation to concrete words varies dramatically between languages.
In this case, you're talking about a word in your conlang with two functions:
A: linking an abstract noun referring to a non-intentional (rather than unintentional) mental state to the possessor/undergoer of that state.
B: expressing a specific intentional (in the philosophical sense) and attitudinal mental state in an observer directed toward a concrete object
There can be no semantic ambiguity between these two functions, because they relate to entirely different classes: the first requires an abstract noun, whereas the second requires a concrete noun.
You then raise the spectre of two futher potential functions:
C: expressing the same intentional mental state linking an observer to the same non-intentional mental state
D: posits that the speaker is a certain concrete object
We can dismiss the possibility of a difficult ambiguity between B and D out of hand immediately. The rest of the semantics are so unrelated that there is no reason why B and D would use the same verb in a real language, unless you chose to do so in order to mimic English idioms [B expresses an attitudinal state (a feeling about) toward a concrete object; D involves a non-attitudinal state (a hypothesis) directed toward an abstract state of affairs (the speaker being that thing); note that "I feel like a lemon" is only a special case of "I feel like he is a lemon" that English happens to license the elision of a duplicated argument in].
As for C, we can't really say that an ambiguity exists between A and C either. On the one hand, it's not clear that it's possible to have an independent intentional state toward an unintentional state, or that a language would have to acknowledge the possibility - so a language might not regard C as a logically possible option. On the other hand, the overt structure of C (as an apparent parallel to B, and hence having a dyadic state of affairs as its object (the speaker experiencing love), and as having the speaker as the expressor of an attitudinal state) is so different from that of A (having a unitary state as its object (love), and having the speaker as the expressor of a non-attitudinal state) that there is no reason to think that a language that DID regard these as two valid and distinct propositions would use the same verb for both!
In other words: many humans would not regard A and C as potentially ambiguous, because they'd regard C as synonymous with A, or as logically incoherent; and many of the humans who WOULD regard A and C as potentially ambiguous would avoid that ambiguity simply by using entirely different constructions for the two.
Likewise, the idea that C and B were so similar semantically that a verb having interpretation B must also have interpretation C seems hugely arbitrary, given how different C and B really are (one is talking about a concrete object, one about an abstract object).
In English, coincidentally, B and C are treated the same way. And therefore, in inventing a verb that you want to do both A and B, you assume that the same verb must also do C, because English treats B and C the same way so your conlang must do likewise. And yet because English does NOT treat A and C the same way, you assume that there is a meaningful semantic difference between them that must be unambiguously respected.
In reality, however, a language could easily have a verb that does A and B but not C. Or it could do A, B and C, but regard A and C as synonymous. Or it could consider A and C as potentially ambiguous but just not care because, let's face it, it's not actually a troubling confusion in real conversations.
------------
Which is a long-winded post, I know, but hopefully explains my thoughts to some degree. I guess the one sentence take-away would be: don't confuse English idioms with the logical structure of propostions!